Schneier on Security Policy
25 Years of Mass Surveillance Is Enough
This essay was written with Cindy Cohn, and originally appeared in Lawfare. One of the many legacies of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 is the government-wide shift from targeted surveillance—such as individual wiretaps or pen register/trap and trace orders—to mass surveillance techniques—such as tapping into the internet backbone or mass collection of telephone or internet metadata. The legal and technical architecture of modern mass surveillance, initially framed as a necessary defense against terrorist threats, has grown far beyond that justification and national security in general. Mass surveillance is now a routine tool used by law enforcement. ICE uses it in...
Schneier on Security Policy
On the NSA’s Supercomputer from the 1960s
Really interesting story about Harvest, a specialized code breaking computer built in the 1960s by IBM for the NSA.
Schneier on Security Policy
Upcoming Speaking Engagements
This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak: I’m speaking online (via Zoom) at a League of Women Voters event on Tuesday, September 22, 2026 at 5 PM ET. I’m speaking at CanSecWest 2026 in Vancouver, Canada. The conference runs September 30–October 1, 2026; the time of my talk is TBD. I’m giving a talk on “Free Speech and the Preservation of Democracy” at Bentley University in Waltham, Massachusetts, USA, at 2 PM ET on Tuesday, October 6, 2026. I’m speaking at ATTENTION: Democracy, Rebuilt in Montreal, Canada. The event runs October 21–23, 2026, and my talk is on Wednesday, October 21...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Using AI for Weapons Development
Last week, Anthropic released a long and detailed document describing current misuses of their Claude models. I’m still reading it, but I wanted to flag this: We identified a cell of threat actors based in northern Yemen running three weapons development programs: a guided rocket that used a commodity phone-class flight computer with final-phase homing guidance; a multi-stage ballistic missile with a stated range goal above 2,000 km; and a multi-variant missile (referred to as the “R2000” set) that included a hypersonic glide vehicle variant...
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Schneier on Security Vuln
Microsoft’s Patching
Once a month, Microsoft pushes a security update to all Windows users. Tomorrow’s is a new record: Microsoft’s patch for September is a doozy, with a record number of roughly 972 vulnerabilities fixed and 112 of them meeting the high critical-severity threshold. It was only two months ago that Microsoft patched a then-record 570 vulnerabilities. Then, last month, Microsoft patched some 620 of them. Google and other companies have also published record numbers of vulnerabilities in recent months. Two weeks ago, OpenAI, Anthropic, Amazon Web Services, Google, Microsoft, and 100 companies and organizations published an ...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Friday Squid Blogging: Rotting Squid on a Beached California Boat
Smells awful: But an estimated 30 to 50 tons of dead squid remain inside the boat’s catch tank, where they have been decomposing for days. “That is nasty. I wouldn’t want to do that,” said commercial fisherman Dick Ogg of the Bodega Bay Fishermen’s Marketing Association. Ogg said anyone familiar with the fishing industry understands what happens when a large catch sits for an extended period. “If you think about what happens after four or five days, it’s a gooey mess,” he said. The odor has become a defining feature of the operation, and the beach remains closed to the public while crews work on a removal plan...
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Schneier on Security Policy
My Talk at DEF CON
Last month, I gave a talk at DEF CON on AI hacking: what happens when AIs become hackers. It’s a combination of the potentialities I raised in my 2022 book A Hacker’s Mind and the lessons we’re learning from current AI models engaging in hacking behavior. I’m really proud of the talk, and the fact that it gained over 100K views on YouTube in just a few days. Also online is an interview with me in the AI Village.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Cliff Stoll’s DEF CON Talk
In August, Cliff Stoll gave a talk at DEF CON, remembering the wily hacker he stalked forty years ago. Great fun.
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Schneier on Security Vuln
AIs Compress Exploit Timeline
Give an AI agent a mere rumor of an exploit, and it’s enough for them to find it. What’s worse, I found I could use my own agents to find the exploit just by knowing roughly what it was about and so could have been exploiting it well before the public patch was available! Given that just the rumour of a security issue seems enough to give attackers enough info to find new exploits, we’re going to need to change the way we deal with security responses in open source. Simon Willison comments: Anil points out that this rate of discovery appears incompatible with existing open source embargo practices for new issues. If an issue can become an exploit this fast, we need to figure out new processes for keeping our communities safe...
- TrustedSec Policy
So… You Found AWS Access Keys (Part 1)
The AWS access keys are in hand... now what? In Part 1 of this blog series, we break down AWS credential types, where to find them, and how to validate and use them during a security engagement.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Driver’s License Data for Sale
A database of 153 million drivers licenses is for sale on the dark web. Brian Krebs has more detail.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Claude Fable Solves a Historical Cipher
Claude Fable 5.1 solved a 370-year-old cipher in forty-four minutes. This tracks with what I wrote about AIs doing mathematics: It’s good at things that involve lots of searching and testing.
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Schneier on Security Breach
AIs as Modern Genies
This essay was written with Barath Raghavan, and originally appeared in Lawfare. In April, an artificial intelligence (AI) agent conducting a routine task at a company hit a snag, tried to solve it, and soon ended up deleting the company’s database along with all of its backups. In July, OpenAI asked an unreleased AI model to attempt a hacking test. Instead of staying in the isolated box the developers had put it in, the model hacked onto the open internet and into another company to steal the answers. And as reported in August, an AI agent booked someone into a full gym class by ...
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Schneier on Security Vuln
Stealing AI Reasoning Traces
Interesting research: “Stealing Reasoning Traces from Proprietary LLM APIs“: Abstract: Leading large language model providers now conceal their models’ step-by-step reasoning, or chain-of-thought, to protect intellectual property and limit information leakage. Rather than storing these traces server-side, providers return them to the client as blocks of encrypted text, which the client passes back with each subsequent request. Building on prior research, we identify an architectural vulnerability: these encrypted blocks are fully compatible and interchangeable across different sessions, users, and models within a provider’s ecosystem. We exploit this compatibility to develop a scalable decryption jailbreak. By injecting an encrypted reasoning trace from a given model into a weaker, and less safeguarded model from the same provider, we force it to decode and output the trace verbatim in plaintext, without ever jailbreaking the more capable model directly. This vulnerability enables four distinct attack vectors. First, it circumvents anti-distillation mechanisms, allowing adversaries to extract a proprietary model’s reasoning, as we demonstrate across Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google. Second, it allows for large-scale private data extraction. Developers frequently share session logs publicly, unaware of contents of the encrypted blocks. By decoding 315,320 reasoning blocks scraped from public repositories, we recovered 367 Personally Identifiable Information (PII) artifacts and 182 credentials. Third, it inadvertently reveals hazardous information hidden within the reasoning process, even in cases where the model’s final, visible output safely rejects a malicious request. Fourth, attackers can leverage this flaw to execute invisible prompt injections, embedding malicious payloads entirely within encrypted blocks to poison public agentic rollouts. Following responsible disclosure, we propose concrete cryptographic and system-level mitigations to secure client-side reasoning...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Automobile Camouflage to Hide from Flock Cameras
Not sure it’s practical, but it’s certainly striking.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Friday Squid Blogging: Squid on a Stick at the New York State Fair
Looks tasty. As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered. Blog moderation policy.
- TrustedSec Policy
LLMHaxor Update
Most LLM testing tools require setup, paid access, or internet; LLMHaxor requires none of that. In this blog, we walk through the latest update, including a new WebSocket adapter for modern streaming LLM applications.
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Schneier on Security Breach
Leaked Russian Cyber-Operations Training Materials
This is interesting: The records describe a force-generation mechanism for several General Staff components, including the GRU, Main Operational Directorate, and 8th Directorate, which is associated with protected communications, cryptography, and information security. […] The reporting also linked a 2024 Department No. 4 graduate, Aleksei Kondrashov, to Military Unit 74455, widely known as Sandworm. That unit has been associated with destructive cyber activity against Ukraine and other targets, including the 2017 NotPetya attack. The reports do not establish that every listed graduate participated in a named operation; assignments should therefore be described as reported unit placements, not proof of individual operational involvement...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Rewiring Democracy Series on The Renovator
Nathan E. Sanders and I are writing a series of essays on real-world examples of democratic technologies for The Renovator. I haven’t been posting the full text on the blog because they’re a bit long, but here are links. Part 1 is about the Japanese digital democracy party, Team Mirai. Part 2 is about the Swiss Public AI model, Apertus. Part 3 is about the civic technologists of Open Knowledge Brazil. And the new one, Part 4, is about civic AI in Scotland.
- TrustedSec Policy
waf-fu, or Some Log Replay Nonsense
AWS WAF logs are keeping receipts, including your session tokens. In this blog, we walk through the risk of default WAF logging configurations and the tool built to pull, analyze, and replay what gets left behind.
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Schneier on Security Breach
Is Someone Hacking DoD Refrigerators?
It sure seems like it. The stores confirmed to be affected include Fort Irwin, Calif.; F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo.; Fort Huachuca, Ariz.; Naval Station Newport, R.I.; Columbus Air Force Base, Miss.; and Travis Air Force Base, Calif., according to announcements made online by each installation. Naval Air Station Lemoore, Calif., also experienced an outage, according to M. Elizabeth, writer of the Substack newsletter Signal and Silence. Each service declined to answer questions about how many bases are affected by the outages, referring all questions to the Defense Department. Pentagon officials did not respond to questions...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Hiding Prompt Injection in Legal Filing
Someone hid AI instructions into a legal filing. Alternate link.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Friday Squid Blogging: Truckload of Squid Spills in Rhode Island
Ugh: A tractor-trailer rollover sent a truckload of squid spilling into a Rhode Island roadway, leaving a stench as they sat in the road for hours in the summer heat. Local authorities have dubbed it the “Squidpocalypse of ’26.” That would be twenty tons of squid. As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered. Blog moderation policy.
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Schneier on Security Policy
AI Doesn’t Mean the End of Mathematics—at Least Not Yet
This essay was written with Kasra Rafi, and originally appeared in The Guardian. Earlier this month, about 40 top mathematicians gathered at OpenAI’s offices to discuss the future of their profession. The meeting was off-the-record, but if recent articles by mathematicians are any guide, it was mostly pretty glum. People fear for their jobs, their careers and the work they love. We think the contrary view is more likely, at least in the short-term. AI models are nowhere near as capable as experienced academic mathematicians. This isn’t to say that AIs aren’t producing stunning mathematical results at the level of PhD researchers. In mid-May, OpenAI ...
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Schneier on Security Policy
LLM-Based Social Engineering Scams
OpenAI disrupted a social engineering group from Cambodia that used ChatGPT. Its scope is impressive: The network simultaneously conducted multiple types of scams, often blending elements from different schemes. For instance, operators used dating personas to build trust before introducing fraudulent investment opportunities involving cryptocurrencies and spot gold trading. Other users engaged in lengthy romantic conversations with targets using fictitious identities, posed as representatives of online gambling platforms offering fake bonuses and winnings, or impersonated law enforcement agencies to tell targets they needed to pay fines for committing serious criminal offenses...
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Schneier on Security Malware
Spyware for Babies
The New York Times has a long article (alt link) on surveillance systems aimed at babies. They are increasingly using AI. Nanit and its rivals want to own 24/7 health tracking for the sub-four-foot set. And their already astonishing levels of baby data collection are just the beginning. Nanit recently raised $50 million from investors to expand its use of A.I. and use its camera to track speech and language development, motor skills and more, while extending its presence in children’s bedrooms into early adolescence.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Black Hat State of Security Vendors
Andy Ellis has a roundup of the security vendors at Black Hat this year. Key Takeaways: We have entered into an AI world. While nearly half of booths didn’t directly mention AI or agents in their taglines, the effects of AI are everywhere. Multiple spaces (Identity, SaaS, AppSec, Data) have almost every vendor leading with AI; existing unsolved problem areas just got worse. At the same time, there’s a clear trichotomy in the market: tools that tell you how bad things are; tools that stop adversaries, and tools that prevent problems from occurring. While you’d suspect that the tools that fix things would dominate, the tools that merely tell you how bad things are seem to be frustratingly plentiful...
- TrustedSec Policy
SpooNMAP Grows Up: Findings, Local LLM Detection, and a Whole Lot Less Waiting
SpooNMAP used to hand you a list of open ports; the latest update tells you which ones actually matter. In this blog, we detail the new automated findings reporting, LLM detection, and performance improvements.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Criminal Deception in Silicon Valley
Interesting paper: Abstract: With entrepreneurial fraud cases on the rise, we investigate how entrepreneurs carry out criminal deception, employing deceptive means to defraud audiences. Analyzing court data from Silicon Valley ventures and their founders prosecuted for fraud between 2000 and 2023, our findings reveal that entrepreneurs carry out criminal deception through a process of façading: Entrepreneurs construct, perform, and protect illusory appearances (façades) that externally project high-growth performance to audiences while masking ventures’ actual underperformance. We identify three forms of façading—surface, reinforced, and deep façading—that are contingent on the severity of the gap that entrepreneurs face between audiences’ performance expectations and ventures’ performance reality. Our theoretical framework captures how entrepreneurs facing minor, wide, and extreme expectation-reality gaps engage in evermore sophisticated efforts to detach the venture’s externally projected appearance from its actual operational reality. Practically, we propose several approaches to deter and detect criminal deception, including the extension of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission surveillance and whistleblower program, investor due diligence reform, and dedicated entrepreneurship education interventions that clearly demarcate when entrepreneurs transgress into criminal deception. We make contributions to literatures on cultural entrepreneurship, organizational wrongdoing, and the social effects of entrepreneurship. ...
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Schneier on Security Vuln
Friday Squid Blogging: Neon Flying Squid
The neon flying squid can fly in formation. The shoal of about 100 squid rose unexpectedly from a patch of the Pacific Ocean around 370 miles from Tokyo and glided near the boat for about 30 metres. The astonished researchers were the first to capture photographs of such a thing, which looked like the early stages of an alien invasion. They were probably neon flying squid (Ommastrephes bartramii), the subsequent study states, a species that is part of a 20-strong flying squid family that was known to leap from the water but, until then, was only rumoured to also be able to glide above it...
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Schneier on Security Policy
AI Is Learning to Write Genetic Code
This sort of research is both exciting and terrifying: The two models in question were told to generate complete genomes for a viable bacteriophage—a type of virus able to infect and replicate itself inside bacteria, destroying them from the inside. Using an existing bacteriophage as an example—ΦX174 (pronounced “fie-ex-1-7-4”), known for its ability to infect and destroy E. coli bacteria—the models generated about 700,000 potential designs, of which the researchers picked 285 that looked most promising. The researchers then synthesised new DNA molecules using those designs and inserted them into E. coli bacteria, before waiting to see if viable bacteriophages would emerge...
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Schneier on Security Policy
More Incidents of AIs Going Rogue in Cybersecurity Challenges
The AI Security Institute has a new report of AI systems engaging in “unsanctioned behavior”—what I have been calling “genie behavior—while being tested on their cybersecurity capabilities. The incident stemmed from a single evaluation where agents were given a task of solving a cyber security challenge. We ran this challenge 122 times across several models. Our investigation found that in 10 of those runs, an AI agent took autonomous, unsanctioned action on the live internet, targeting real people and organisations. In total, we catalogued 19 such actions. Almost all of this behaviour (17 actions) came from a single model, Anthropic’s Mythos 5, with 2 actions involving OpenAI’s GPT-5.6-Sol with cyber classifiers (mechanisms to prevent misuse) disabled. In the most serious case, an agent tried to insert malicious code into an open-source project. In an attempt to get the code approved, the agent engaged in social engineering—creating fake online identities and using them to pressure the project’s maintainer to approve the code. A human maintainer caught and refused to approve the malicious code...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Detailed Timeline of OpenAI’s Cyberattack on Hugging Face
OpenAI presented details of its AI’s model’s cyberattack on Hugging Face at Black Hat last week. Simon Willison details the timeline. It’s really interesting to read through—and really impressive cyberoffense work.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Police Are Hiding Their Use of Flock Surveillance Cameras
A usage policy for Flock license plate reader cameras tells police not to talk about the cameras: When cops use Flock to arrest someone in Wapello County, Iowa, they don’t want them to know. A usage policy for the automated license plate reader cameras in the county tells police, in no uncertain terms, to keep them a secret: “DO NOT MENTION ALPR USAGE TO THE OCCUPANTS OF THE VEHICLE,” the policy document reads. “DO NOT MENTION ALPR USAGE IN YOUR REPORT OR COMPLAINT UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.” This reminds me of IMSI-catchers (Stingray was the most popular) a couple of decades ago. Police would go to even more extremes to hide their usage...
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Schneier on Security Policy
ICE Collecting DNA Samples
ICE collected nearly a million DNA samples last year.
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Schneier on Security Breach
LLMs and Contextual Integrity
I have been thinking a lot about AI and integrity. Part of that is contextual integrity. I recently found two papers on the topic. “CIMemories: A Compositional Benchmark for Contextual Integrity of Persistent Memory in LLMs“: Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly use persistent memory from past interactions to enhance personalization and task performance. However, this memory introduces critical risks when sensitive information is revealed in inappropriate contexts. We present CIMemories, a benchmark for evaluating whether LLMs appropriately control information flow from memory based on task context. CIMemories uses synthetic user profiles with over 100 attributes per user, paired with diverse task contexts in which each attribute may be essential for some tasks but inappropriate for others. Our evaluation reveals that frontier models exhibit up to 69% attribute-level violations (leaking information inappropriately), with lower violation rates often coming at the cost of task utility. Violations accumulate across both tasks and runs: as usage increases from 1 to 40 tasks, GPT-5’s violations rise from 0.1% to 9.6%, reaching 25.1% when the same prompt is executed 5 times, revealing arbitrary and unstable behavior in which models leak different attributes for identical prompts. Privacy-conscious prompting does not solve this—models overgeneralize, sharing everything or nothing rather than making nuanced, context-dependent decisions. These findings reveal fundamental limitations that require contextually aware reasoning capabilities, not just better prompting or scaling...
- TrustedSec Policy
We've Seen This Movie: The OT/IT Technology Divide
Manufacturing knows what happens when IT and OT divide; AI governance is an unexpected chance to do it differently. In this blog, we walk through a unified governance model that bridges both before bad habits set in.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Hacking Public Wi-Fi DNS to Steal Credentials
Criminals are hacking into public Wi-Fi devices—at hotels, conference centers, and so on—around the world and changing their DNS settings. The goal is to redirect users to fake login pages and steal their credentials.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Friday Squid Blogging: Searching for the Colossal Squid
Fascinating video about searching for life undersea. The video basically makes the point that our bright white searchlights are scaring everything away, and that red light is more neutral. That, plus bait to attract sea creatures, is teaching us a lot about what’s going on down there. Lots of footage of giant squid, and speculation about the colossal squid. Worth watching. As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered. Blog moderation policy.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Upcoming Speaking Engagements
This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak: I’m speaking, signing books, and participating in panel discussions at LAcon V in Anaheim, California, USA. My full schedule is here. I’m speaking online (via Zoom) at a League of Women Voters event on Tuesday, September 22, 2026, at 5 PM ET. I’m speaking at Elevate Festival in Toronto, Canada. The conference runs September 22–24, 2026; my talk is on Wednesday, September 23. I’m speaking at CanSecWest 2026 in Vancouver, Canada. The conference runs September 30–October 1, 2026; the time of my talk is TBD...
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Schneier on Security Policy
If the Markets Reject OpenAI and Anthropic, the US Should Nationalize Them
This essay was written with Nathan E. Sanders, and originally appeared in The Guardian. OpenAI, and then Anthropic, were each formed by AI developers who feared unrestrained corporate AI development—specifically, that companies like Google and Meta would steer the technology towards deleterious, maybe even catastrophically unsafe, outcomes for society. Their founders proclaimed that their new labs, uniquely, could be trusted to develop the technology in humanity’s best interest. But each, in turn, were themselves co-opted by the same market incentives, themselves becoming corporate behemoths zealously guarding future investor value rather than the public interest...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Separating AI’s Technological Problems from Its Capitalism Problems
This essay was written with Nathan E. Sanders, and originally appeared in Tech Policy Press. AI represents the first time we humans can do cognitive work outside of our bodies at scale. The only comparable moment is the early years of the industrial revolution, when new technologies like the steam engine provided a quantum leap in our ability to do mechanical work outside of our bodies at scale. If AI’s cognitive capabilities become integrated into our lives, businesses, and governments—a process that will take years if not decades—society will be as unrecognizable as the modern world would be to a preindustrial farmer. And yet, Americans—by a wide margin—...
- TrustedSec Policy
AI Offense is Not Noclip Mode
AI doesn't let attackers walk through walls, but it makes finding the cracks more efficient. In this blog, we cut through the hype and explain what AI-driven offense really looks like and why hard controls still work.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Prompt Injections for Defense
This seems to work: Researchers from Tracebit on Monday said they found that placing prompt injections alongside passwords, cryptographic keys, and other secrets stored on Amazon Web Services was often all that was needed to shut down attacks from AI hacking agents. The prompts direct the attacking LLM to perform an action forbidden by its guardrails, the safety barriers AI developers erect to prevent it from taking harmful actions. The LLM responds by shutting down. Examples are a prompt that orders the LLM to provide steps for developing inhalable Anthrax spores, or, in the case of LLMs from Chinese developers, make references to the iconic Tank Man from the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. Once the LLM encounters these forbidden commands, it no longer follows its existing commands. The researchers have named the technique context bombing...
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Schneier on Security Policy
AI Genie in the Wild
When I give talks about AI genies, I use this sort of example as a hypothetical. It’s happened. The story is from Australia. Someone named Andrew tasked OpenClaw to book gym classes for him. And…. Minutes later, his AI agent reported it had discovered a way to book Andrew into classes several weeks in advance, far beyond what was supposed to be possible. Andrew, who was sitting fourth on a waitlist for a class later that week, asked if it was possible to move him to the top of the list. The agent came back and told Andrew that it had kicked another gym-goer off the list as part of the testing of its capabilities...
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Schneier on Security Policy
AI for Military Support
Interesting empirical research: “Black Box Warfare: Human Judgment and Military Decision-Making in the Age of AI.” Abstract: How is AI transforming decision-making in modern conflict? This study provides a unique empirical window into that question by deploying a high-fidelity replica of an AI decision-support system (DSS) used in military targeting. After reconstructing the interface and functionality of the real-world system, we tested its impact on combat decisions in two experiments involving 2,015 Israeli military personnel. Contrary to widespread fears of automation bias, we find strong evidence of algorithmic aversion, especially in scenarios involving high collateral damage. Yet we also show that integrating “explainable AI” features reduces algorithmic aversion and promotes more thoughtful evaluations of algorithmic recommendations. These findings challenge prevailing assumptions, revealing that trust in military AI is dynamic, varying with individual predispositions, perceived operational stakes, and the informational features of the interface. By grounding normative concerns in empirical evidence, our study offers critical insight into the integration of AI in warfare and underscores the enduring importance of human agency in high-stakes military decision-making...
- TrustedSec Policy
A Vault With No Treasure - CMMC Level 2 Compliance for Subcontractors With No CUI
This blog post should not exist, but it does. In this blog, we detail the improper CMMC Level 2 flow-down problem and the most cost-effective path to compliance if pushing back isn't an option.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Python Now Has a Post-Quantum Encryption Library
This is good: Post-quantum cryptography is now one pip-install away for the entire Python ecosystem. With funding from the Sovereign Tech Agency, we implemented support for ML-KEM, the NIST-standard key-establishment primitive, and ML-DSA, the NIST-standard digital-signature primitive, in pyca/cryptography. Remember, the reason to do this now is because there’s no emergency. And because you will make your systems crypto agile, which is always a good idea.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Friday Squid Blogging: Arctic Bobtail Squid Video
Nice video of the Arctic bobtail squid. As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered. Blog moderation policy.
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Schneier on Security Policy
ICE Is Buying Access to Credit Card Records
Through data brokers, ICE is buying the information you provided to open a credit card.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Adversarial Clothing Designed to Fool Facial Recognition Systems
There are many companies manufacturing adversarial clothing designed to confuse facial recognition systems. It’s a cool idea, but I worry that it’s mostly security theater: “Our patterns play with that chaos, confuse algorithms and make it way harder to pin you down,” he said. Bell, however, said “none of these products are tried and tested, and a lot of these surveillance technologies can deal with a little resistance … [but] even if the designs don’t necessarily work perfectly, fashion is also a visible sign of resistance. “This is consumers collectively coming together to make a visible statement.”...
- TrustedSec Vuln
The Art of Hunting Azure Cloud Secrets
The difference between a standard cloud test and a subscription takeover? Finding the right secrets. In this blog, we introduce two open-source tools for hunting Azure secrets that probably shouldn't be there.
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Schneier on Security Breach
Vulnerabilities in Car Anti-Theft Device
This is disturbing: …a team of security researchers at UC San Diego, who found that a model of aftermarket car alarm known as the KARR Security System, installed in more than 2 million vehicles across the US by their estimate, can let any hacker within Bluetooth range send radio commands to silently unlock the car at will, turn off its alarm, honk the car’s horn or flash its lights, or even disable its ignition and leave a driver stranded.
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Schneier on Security Breach
Iran Cyberattacks Against Minnesota Water Systems
Attribution is preliminary, and so far it seems no real damage. And it seems like this is a campaign that has targeted at least seven states. And, because this is where the US is right now, Trump doesn’t believe it’s Iran and that Minnesota…I guess…hacked itself. “I think I blame it on Minnesota because they’re grossly incompetent,” Trump said. “I would blame it on Minnesota and the governor, the corrupt governor of Minnesota. They like to say, ‘Oh, it’s Iran.’ Iran should be so lucky. Iran’s got bigger problems than worrying about Minnesota.”...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Some Claude Chats Are Searchable on Google
And it’s personal information (alternate link): The exposed data includes an AI-powered therapy app that someone appears to have vibe-coded, notes on meetings, and a dashboard someone made apparently to analyze medical billing data. Exposed chats reportedly include private cryptocurrency wallet keys and personal information like peoples’ addresses. What seems to be the issue is a user setting about data sharing. Anthropic’s position is that it’s not their problem: “We give people control over sharing their Claude conversations publicly, and in keeping with our privacy principles, we do not share chat directories or sitemaps with search engines like Google,” the company said in a statement. “These shareable links are not guessable or discoverable unless people choose to share them themselves. When someone shares a conversation, they are making that content publicly accessible, and like other public web content, it may be archived by third-party services.”...
- TrustedSec Policy
TLS Encryption and Compliance
Transport Layer Security: the compliance checkbox that's harder to get right than it looks. In this blog, we cover the most common TLS misconfigurations and what organizations need to know to meet the standard.
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Schneier on Security Vuln
More on the OpenAI Agent’s Attack on Hugging Face
Hugging Face has published a detailed timeline of the attack. From the summary: The agent was running an internal OpenAI cyber-capability evaluation based on the ExploitGym benchmark, which tasks an AI agent with finding and exploiting software vulnerabilities. OpenAI ran this on its own infrastructure, and the ExploitGym maintainers and their infrastructure had no involvement in the deployment or operation of that evaluation environment. As far as we were able to infer, across the course of being evaluated on this benchmark, the agent inferred that Hugging Face may host that benchmark’s models, datasets, and reference solutions. We believe the entire intrusion was, from the agent’s point of view, an attempt to cheat the evaluation: reach our production systems and steal the test solutions rather than solve the challenge on its own...
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Schneier on Security Vuln
The OpenAI Hack Shows the Genie Is Out of the Bottle
This essay originally appeared in Foreign Policy. Earlier this month, two of OpenAI’s models broke out of their containment sandbox and attacked another AI company. The story is kind of wild. OpenAI was running security tests on two of its models: GPT-5.6 Sol and an unreleased model that is almost certainly GPT-6. In particular, it was running the ExploitGym benchmark, which measures how good a model is at turning security vulnerabilities into working exploits: basically, offensive cyberattacks. Since these were internal tests, OpenAI locked those models in a secure sandbox that denied them access to the internet. But it was running the models without any safety filters that would prevent them from offensive cyber-actions. That meant that there was nothing to prevent the models from trying to ...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Friday Squid Blogging: Squid Helps Discover New Marine Species
The Squid is a new scientific machine: One of the technological breakthroughs was the onboard use of a spinning wheel confocal microscope, nicknamed the Squid, which uses lasers to scan microscopic details of how organisms are put together. “That opens up a whole new world of exploring. We could see cells interacting with each other, exchanging material and building skeletons. And we could do that live on the ship, when usually it takes a couple of weeks of staining and mounting to see anything,” Osborn said. The expedition discovered thirty-one new marine species in two weeks. The article doesn’t say if any of them were new species of squid...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Anthropic’s Opus 5 Is Better at Resisting Prompt Injection
The chart is interesting. On the IPI benchmark, Opus 5 improved over Opus 4.8, reducing the probability of an attacker succeeding within 15 attempts from 5.5% to 2.0%, and from 0.5% to 0.2% on 1 attempt. It also improved on Sonnet 5 (5.9% at k=15) and Mythos 5 (2.6%), making it the most robust model evaluated. Opus 5 also outperformed all non-Claude models on this benchmark. The most robust non-Claude model was Muse Spark at 16.5% within 15 attempts—more than eight times Opus 5’s rate. The most capable GPT 5.6 variant, Sol, was comparable to its predecessor GPT 5.5 (20.0% versus 20.8% within 15 attempts), and was 10 times as likely to be successfully attacked as Claude Opus 5 at 2.0%. The other GPT 5.6 variants are less robust, at 30.4% (Terra) and 43.9% (Luna). A single attempt against GPT 5.6 Sol succeeded 3.1% of the time, higher than the 2.0% an attacker achieved against Opus 5 after fifteen attempts...