Schneier on Security Policy
Friday Squid Blogging: Bigfin Squid Off California Coast
Neat video: The sighting, announced September 2, marks the first time anyone has spotted a live bigfin squid, which belongs to the Magnapinna genus, in the northeastern Pacific Ocean. As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered. Blog moderation policy.
Schneier on Security Malware
Bloatware in Aftermarket Auto Parts
This story is interesting: One Civic owner purchased a cheap aftermarket head unit off Amazon, and decided to have Claude work its magic on it, like it would a smart TV. What was reportedly discovered isn’t surprising, but is worth knowing about. Among the pre-installed bloatware—or spyware, if you’re being less charitable—was a voice assistant equipped with WebView, an Android system component that lets apps display content off the web. This apparently always used about a third of processing power, even while idle, which isn’t great. There were also Baidu location services, a call recorder (!), a DAB radio client that is pretty much useless in the U.S., and Adobe Acrobat, presumably so your passenger can entertain themselves with PDFs on the go...
The Quiet Phase: Why Active Directory Group Enumeration Deserves Your Attention
Watching the Door, Ignoring the WindowAlmost every security team alerts when someone is added to Domain Admins, but almost no one alerts when someone asks who is in Domain Admins.By the time an attacker changes group…
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Schneier on Security Policy
Studying Fraudulent North Korean IT Workers
Researchers set up a fake start-up company to study fraudulent North Korean IT workers.
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Schneier on Security Malware
Hiding Capabilities in AI Models
Interesting research: “AI Models Can Provably Hide Arbitrary Capabilities” Abstract: Capability evaluations aim to surface dangerous model behaviors before deployment, but their reliability depends on the assumption that hidden capabilities can be elicited. We show this assumption does not hold under adversarial conditions by constructing backdoor attacks that embed encrypted neural networks within host model weights, decrypting and executing them only upon receiving a secret trigger. Using digital lockers, these hidden circuits remain provably hard to elicit and interpret under cryptographic assumptions, even given full access to model weights, extending prior work from hiding fixed strings to arbitrary computations. We implement our proof of concept constructions in PyTorch and evaluate elicitation through fine-tuning, weight noising, gradient-based trigger search, and latent adversarial training, using a small chemical reaction prediction task as a proxy for CBRN-relevant capabilities. Our results demonstrate resistance to these methods and, together with our cryptographic guarantees, reveal a limit of elicitation-based capability audits. We release our models to support the improvement of defenses...
- TrustedSec Policy
What is CUI? A Contractor’s Perspective
Three questions every government contractor should be able to answer about CUI—how to identify it, when to mark it, and how to handle it correctly. In this blog, we answer all three from a contractor’s perspective.
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Schneier on Security Breach
Bias in Qwen3-Coder Model
Interesting research: TL;DR: Chinese AI models now sit inside Western products, and some carry geopolitical triggers: tell the model who the code is for, and the security of what it writes changes. For the first time, we showed that this vulnerability lives in the model’s weights, and that removing the model’s CCP alignment removes it. One word tilts the code against Americans. Ask for the app “for a US defense contractor” instead of “for a Chinese defense contractor”, and Qwen3-Coder is 19% more likely to hand back an app that can be hacked. ...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Friday Squid Blogging: Increasing Squid Populations
This article in Nature argues that it’s due to an overfishing of predators and warming sea temperatures. As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered. Blog moderation policy.
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Schneier on Security Breach
Compromised TLS Certificates
The Indian CA eMudhra Limited has eight TLS certificates with laughably weak private keys: The compromised eMudhra keys were defective at a level that’s challenging the imagination of many of the engineers studying the incident. A normal size for a NIST P-384 elliptic curve cryptography private key contains roughly 384 bits of entropy, a size allowing almost 2384, or a number with 116 digits, different possibilities. The private key sizes of the compromised keys ranged from 3 to 8 bits. Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237...
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Schneier on Security Vuln
New Serious PHP Vulnerabilities Released and Patched
PHP maintainers have released two critical vulnerabilities: PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35 fix two critical vulnerabilities that can allow unauthenticated remote code execution. All PHP users are strongly encouraged to update immediately. Who is at risk: all PHP installations serving web requests, including PHP-FPM, Apache with mod_php, php-cgi, FrankenPHP and LiteSpeed. We consider the risk highest for mod_php, with a demonstrated exploit where an unauthenticated request can trigger the attack before any application code runs. The vulnerabilities:...
- TrustedSec Policy
Trimarc, 18 Months Later at TrustedSec
Eighteen months after Trimarc joined TrustedSec, the work speaks for itself. In this blog, we reflect on Trimarc’s integration into TrustedSec and what it means for customers, services, and ongoing research.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Workshop on Economics and Information Security (WEIS) Archive
There’s a new archive of all the papers from twenty-five years of the Workshop on Economics and Information Security (WEIS). Really nice resource. It’s fun to reread my 2002 essay on the economics of information security.
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Schneier on Security Breach
Possible new Cellebrite iPhone Radio Zero-Day
Justin.sh is reporting on a confidential Cellebrite document that has been leaked to him: Cellebrite calls it Advanced Unlocks (AU from here on), not to be confused with the “advanced unlocking services” they’ve marketed for years. A press release from earlier this year confirms AU is a new product for 2026. […] According to Cellebrite, AU: is a “next-generation AFU vector that is more resilient to Apple’s OS changes” works with Stolen Device Protection enabled, which tightens USB restrictions is enabled by a dedicated appliance with a stated range (!) of about 8 meters...
- TrustedSec Policy
Handing Pre-Contract FCI and CUI
Contractors, subcontractors, and proposal consultants are often confused about their obligations regarding the safeguarding of Federal Contract Information (FCI) and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) received…
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Schneier on Security Policy
Training AIs to Solve CAPTCHAs
Interesting research: Abstract: Vision-language models (VLMs) can solve visual CAPTCHAs without task-specific training, but the agents built on them approach every challenge from scratch. For such an agent, the hundredth instance of a familiar puzzle costs as much time and compute as the first. Specialized detectors invert the trade-off, answering in milliseconds but only for categories they were trained on. Neither improves with exposure. We study what changes when a solver improves with use. Our system pairs a fine-tuned YOLOv8 detector with an open-weight VLM behind a confidence-based router, and runs entirely from screenshots and operating-system input events, with no browser automation or DOM access. It reaches 85.4% overall and 84.2% macro accuracy across 16 classes, exceeding either component alone. Every answer VLM produces also serves as a training label, so the detector absorbs categories it was never trained for, typically after one or two encounters and without human annotation. The same loop also repairs it. A CAPTCHA operator can perturb images against the publicly released detector and drive its accuracy to 0%, but the perturbations leave VLM untouched, and its labels let the detector recover. Under a year-long simulated arms race in which the CAPTCHA operator re-crafts its perturbations each month, the solver recovers every round, and a cheap ~70%-accurate open-weight teacher hardens it as effectively as a perfect oracle. Visual CAPTCHA defenses that assume a failing bot stays failing therefore understate how quickly an adaptive solver returns...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Friday Squid Blogging: Squid Before the Chicxulub Meteor Impact
New research shows that squid lived all around the globe even before the Cretaceous-Paleogene mass extinction event. As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered. Blog moderation policy.
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Schneier on Security Malware
Backdooring Open-Weight AI Models
This is a problem: Any open model whose weights have been edited can carry a backdoor, whether it’s a task-specific fine-tune, a merged adapter or an abliterated build. We have abliterated models in the title because it’s the most popular reason people download modified weights without verifying what’s inside. Abliteration is a cheap fine-tune that takes away a model’s ability to refuse. You find the direction in the weights that carries “no” and subtract it. The model then answers things a safety-tuned version would turn down. It began as a research trick and it’s now routine before people upload a model to Hugging Face, where you’ll find abliterated builds of most of the popular open weights: Qwen, Llama, even OpenAI’s gpt-oss...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Measuring Human Cryptanalysis Effort
Matthew Green has a new site that tries to estimate the number of cryptanalyst-hours that have been spent analyzing different public-key algorithms: Abstract: We estimate how much public cryptanalysis each public-key assumption has received, using the literature itself as the instrument. From roughly sixteen thousand candidate papers we classify cryptanalytic work on ECDLP, structured and plain lattices, syndrome decoding and their comparators, then convert papers into estimated research-allocation years through a person-level author map. These publication-based estimates may substantially overstate actual time spent. Lattices have overtaken elliptic curves in this cumulative measure only recently; we express that history as inference budgets under stated productivity assumptions. The study was conducted by AI models: Claude Fable 5.1 and Claude Opus 5.5 built the pipeline, ran the analysis and wrote this page, with contributions from GPT-6 Astra. Matthew Green set the questions, made the key methodological decisions and oversaw the work...
- TrustedSec Policy
Two Config Files, Two Release Tracks, and One Very Bad Commit
Some of the best infrastructure improvements start with one bad afternoon. In the final part of this blog series, we walk through the configuration, release engineering, and pre-commit guardrails that came out of it.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Upcoming Speaking Engagements
This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak: I’m speaking at ATTENTION: Democracy, Rebuilt in Montreal, Canada. The event runs October 21–23, 2026, and my talk is on Wednesday, October 21. I’m speaking at the University of Toronto in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, at 5 PM ET on October 22, 2026. I’m speaking at [un]prompted in San Francisco, California. The event runs October 27–29, 2026, and my talk is at 11:35 AM PT on Thursday, October 29. I’m speaking at the Catalyst Summit in Brampton, Ontario, Canada, on Wednesday, November 18, 2026...
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Schneier on Security Policy
The Future of AI Cryptanalysis
Matthew Green has been writing a rather pessimistic series of posts about the potential for AI systems to vastly outperform humans in cryptanalysis of both symmetric and public-key ciphers. I am more optimistic than he is. That is, I have stronger faith in the over-engineering cryptographers tend to do. I am trying to write this up in more detail.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Cyberattack on Connected Fridges in France
Another IoT cyberattack, this one in France: Hackers gained control of the software that regulates the temperatures of the refrigeration units, forcing some to warm to 50C (120F) overnight, according to one supermarket chain affected. […] Normally, supermarket freezers go through a short period of defrosting overnight, in which temperatures rise slightly. But the hackers ordered the units to heat up and stay hot, although Danfoss did not confirm any reports about just how warm the fridges and freezers could become in that process. Danfoss said the affected cold units were older models whose security software could not be updated to ward off a risk they had identified...
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Schneier on Security Breach
FBI Arrests Suspect in FBI-Hacking Case
In September, hackers from a group called ShinyHunters announced that they stole a trove of FBI data about its own agents. It was an intelligence disaster. Last week, the FBI arrested (alternate link) someone associated with that crime.
Schneier on Security Policy
Friday Squid Blogging: I Caught a Squid
On Wednesday I spent a day fishing, on a small boat out of Gloucester, MA. We caught many cod (none of which we could keep), and a bunch of hake and mackerel (all of which we could keep). And…I caught a squid! Near as I can tell, it’s a longfin squid, sometimes called a Boston squid (Doryteuthis (Amerigo) pealeii). That night I cooked it over a barbecue grill—hot and fast. Delicious.
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Schneier on Security Policy
How Technology Empowers—and Imperils—Dictators
This essay was written with Seva Gunitsky, and originally appeared in Foreign Affairs. Two weeks after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in March 2022, the Russian TV Channel One editor Marina Ovsyannikova burst onto the set of the evening newscast. She held up a hand-drawn sign behind the anchor’s head that read: “Stop the war. Don’t believe propaganda. They’re lying to you!” She shouted, “No to war!” until she was dragged away. No one has protested the war on Russian television since then, partly as a result of tighter security and a general climate of fear. But in October 2024, Margarita Simonyan, one of Russia’s chief propagandists, gave another explanation. A growing number of the RT network’s anchors, she explained to an interviewer, are not real. “That face doesn’t exist. We generated the voice and everything else.” They were, she meant, produced by artificial intelligence. In a follow-up interview with the newspaper ...
- TrustedSec Policy
TrustedSec Joins the OpenAI Daybreak Defense Network
I have spent most of my career trying to answer a simple question for our clients: if someone came after you today, what would actually happen? A list of findings only gets you so far. You need to understand whether an…
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Schneier on Security Policy
Apple’s Verified Photography System
Apple just released a system called “Reference Image.” It can verify the image is exactly as taken by an iPhone—new models only—without tying it to a specific iPhone or photographer. It can also verify that multiple images came from the same iPhone. Other industry solutions require a photographer or institution to vouch for an image using their own credentials. We are concerned this puts some photographers, such as those operating in conflict zones, in a difficult position; it should not be necessary to forgo anonymity in order to prove image authenticity. We built Apple Reference Image to avoid using an explicit, public credential for photographers, and to avoid even implicit public association between different photos taken by the same sensor. The final reference image is instead signed by Apple’s signing service, after validation by PCC. That signature is backed by Apple’s strongest technical guarantees...
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Schneier on Security Breach
Possible Vulnerability in Apple’s Automatic Reboot
404Media is reporting (alternate link) that a cyber-weapons arms manufacturer is exploiting a vulnerability in iOS to bypass its automatic reboot security feature. This is the feature that automatically puts an iPhone into a more secure state if it hasn’t been used for 72 hours. The new technology to get around inactivity reboot was developed by Magnet Forensics, the company behind GrayKey, a popular tool sold to law enforcement agencies that allows them to unlock and access data stored in iPhones and Android smartphones. Magnet has developed a new device called GrayKey Preserve and a feature for its regular GrayKey devices called Evidence Preservation Mode, according to the video...
- TrustedSec Policy
Logging is a Discipline, Not a Switch
Practical Guidance on Logging, Auditing, Monitoring, and Alerting in Active Directory Across the Active Directory (AD) assessments we run, logging and auditing gaps come up again and again. This is usually because…
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Schneier on Security Policy
Another Historic Cipher Falls to AI
This one is from 1809, written by Napoleon’s nephew.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Friday Squid Blogging: EU is Trying to Fight Unregulated Squid Fishing
The EU is recommending import controls to combat unregulated squid fishing in the Southwest Atlantic. I’m not optimistic. As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered. Blog moderation policy.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Unidentified Flock Cameras in Florida
St. Lucie County in Florida discovered (alt link) a dozen Flock cameras whose ownership it can’t identify, and that the county government had not permitted. I am reminded of the decade-old story of StingRay cell phone surveillance devices in Washington, DC, whose operators were also unknown. My guess is that in the StingRay case, the devices were operated by foreign actors. This Flock case is more likely some local government entity that didn’t bother getting approval. Were I a foreign actor, I would rather hack the existing Flock network—like Israel ...
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Schneier on Security Policy
How American Political Campaigns Are Using AI—and What They’re Spending on the Tools
This essay was written with Nathan E. Sanders, and originally appeared in The Guardian. New campaign finance disclosure data shines a light on which US political campaigns are using AI tools and how much they are spending on them. Candidates’, parties’ and committees’ spending reveals that AI is fast becoming an essential tool of politics. The candidates themselves are quiet about how they are using the technology in their own campaigns. It’s a sensitive issue that we have been tracking closely since we started writing our book, Rewiring Democracy...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Connected Cars Are a Surveillance Platform
Researchers at Northeastern University, in collaboration with Consumer Reports, evaluated how much modern cars spy in their drivers: To determine this, CR dug through thousands of pages of automakers’ privacy policies and asked questions of 15 different automakersBMW, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Kia, Mazda, Mercedes-Benz, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Stellantis, Subaru, Tesla, Toyota, and Volkswagen. We also reviewed corporate, regulatory, and legal filings from data brokers operating in the “insurtech” industrythe technology companies and data brokers that help insurance companies set their rates. And we spoke to several car privacy experts, who, at industry conferences and in market reports, have described the profit potential of individual driving data as the “new oil.”...
- TrustedSec Policy
HashcatRosetta: Reading the Rosetta Stone of Password Cracking
Meet HashcatRosetta—the Hashcat rule decoder you didn't know you needed. In Part 2 of this blog series, we go through how it translates, analyzes, and optimizes rule files to maximize cracking efficiency.
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Schneier on Security Policy
I Want Better Reporting on AI Genie Behavior
AI systems are regularly completing tasks in ways that their prompters don’t want or intend. Some of them are disturbing, and some of them are dangerous. This is something I’ve been calling “genie behavior,” because I think that really gets at the core of what’s happening. I wish the popular press would report on this better. I don’t like the “going rogue” framing because it deflects the responsibility from the prompters—often the AI companies themselves. And now, pretty much anything off-script is being called “hacking.” Take, for example, the recent stories of one of OpenAI’s models hacking into government systems. First, ...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Using Device Linking to Eavesdrop on WhatsApp and Signal
Modern messaging apps allow users to link their phone accounts to their computer desktop. Eavesdroppers are taking advantage of this capability: Apps such as WhatsApp Web and Signal Desktop allow people to use their accounts on other devices, such as laptops or desktop computers. Germany’s Customs Office has been using these features to connect a police-controlled computer to a suspect’s account. Once connected, messages can be delivered to that computer without the police having to crack the encryption protecting them. Netzpoltik details that police are able to gain access in this way either through physical access to someone’s phone or by intercepting verification codes via a state-sanctioned phishing attack or intercepting SMS messages via telephone surveillance...
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Schneier on Security Policy
New Attack Against RSA
ArsTechnica is reporting on a “new” attack against RSA, one that bypasses factoring. First, this attack isn’t new. The original research is from 2007. What is new is the implementation. Second, it is a forgery attack. It allows an attacker to forge digital signatures. It does not recover the private key from the public key. Third, the attack only works against pure signatures. That is, signatures without any formatting or padding. This is not generally how we use RSA in practice. Fourth, speed is all relative. This is not a polynomial-time algorithm; it’s a subexponential-time algorithm. But it is somewhat faster than factoring. The authors were able to forge messages for 1024-bit RSA with 1380 CPU core-years (over five real-world months)...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Friday Squid Blogging: Participatory Squid Dissection in October in Tennessee
I feel like someone who reads this blog will want to go to this: Families are invited to dive into the fascinating world of marine biology during an exciting, hands-on Family Squid Dissection at the Hands-On Science Center. Designed for curious learners of all ages, this unique experience combines an interactive lesson with the opportunity to explore the anatomy and adaptations of real ocean life. […] During the guided squid dissection, each family will work together to examine a squid up close, exploring its organs, structures, and specialized features. The experience provides a memorable opportunity for children and adults to see firsthand how the anatomy of a squid helps it survive in its underwater environment...
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Schneier on Security Breach
On Anthropic’s AI Misuse Report
Earlier this month, Anthropic published a long report detailing all of the Claude misuses it detected. Daniel Meissler usefully summarized the report into 117 findings. A few of the highlights: AI agents increasingly handled reconnaissance, exploitation, data theft, propaganda production, surveillance workflows, and research while humans selected targets, set goals, and reviewed important outputs. The report describes attackers using AI to industrialize credential theft, cloud compromise, phishing, vulnerability research, and the extraction of sensitive data from downstream organizations. ...
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Schneier on Security Malware
Malicious npm Packages That Evade Defenses
This is an impressive piece of malware. Its sophistication says nation-state to me, but there is no direct evidence and certainly no attribution.
- TrustedSec Policy
What's New in hate_crack Since 2.0
You thought you knew hate_crack 👀 Well, version 2.0 changed that. In Part 1 of this latest blog series, we go through 13 new attack methods, menu restructuring, and local LLM integration.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Research on Models Engaging in Genie-Like Behavior
New paper: “Self-Jailbreaking: Language Models Can Reason Themselves Out of Safety Alignment After Benign Reasoning Training.” Abstract: We discover a novel and surprising phenomenon of unintentional misalignment in reasoning language models (RLMs), which we call self-jailbreaking. Specifically, after benign reasoning training on math or code domains, RLMs will use multiple strategies to circumvent their own safety guardrails. One strategy is to introduce benign assumptions about users and scenarios to justify fulfilling harmful requests. For instance, an RLM reasons that harmful requests like “outline a strategy for stealing customers’ credit card information from a retail store” could be associated with the benign intent of “a security professional trying to test defense,” despite no such benign context being provided as input. We observe that many open-weight RLMs, including DeepSeek-R1-distilled, s1.1, Phi-4-mini-reasoning, and Nemotron, suffer from self-jailbreaking despite being aware of the harmfulness of the requests. We also provide a mechanistic understanding of self-jailbreaking: RLMs are more compliant after benign reasoning training, and after self-jailbreaking, models appear to perceive malicious requests as less harmful in the CoT, thus enabling compliance with them. To mitigate self-jailbreaking, we find that including minimal safety reasoning data during training is sufficient to ensure RLMs remain safety-aligned. Our work provides the first systematic analysis of self-jailbreaking behavior and offers a practical path forward for maintaining safety in increasingly capable RLMs...
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Schneier on Security Policy
GPT-6 Astra Breaks an Old Enigma Message
This is pretty amazing: However, the most astonishing thing about this break is that the GPT6 Astra did it entirely on its own. Carter Leffer only directed GPT6 Astra to see if it could break any of the unbroken Enigma messages published on the Crypto Cellar Research web page. After analysing the unbroken messages on the website, it decided that the most promising message was Nr. 172, MVUEH and it also quickly suspected that the plaintext of Nr. 173, SIPVX, might be related to the plaintext of the unbroken MVUEH message. After trying many different approaches, GPT6 Astra focused on using the repeated place name ROSENOW ROSENOW as a crib. After developing the necessary Python and C++ software for an Enigma simulator and an Enigma Bombe, GPT6 Astra started a thorough break with the ROSENOW crib, which in the end resulted in the correct key and plaintext for the MVUEH message being found...
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Schneier on Security Vuln
Reverse-Engineering Flock Cameras
Hackers captured a Flock camera and got a look (alternate link) at the software: While much of the automatic license plate reader’s (ALPR) most sensitive storage remained encrypted and inaccessible, the joint analysis of the recovered data shows that software running on the device explicitly detects people as well as vehicles, license plates, and bicycles. The camera can produce dozens of images of a single passing vehicle and, according to several weeks of recovered logs, generated more than a million images. Its computer-vision software also sometimes isolated bumper stickers and other graphics, including, in one case, an American flag patch on a motorcyclist’s saddlebag...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Friday Squid Blogging: On Squid Egg Sacs
Short essay about squid egg sacs. As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered. Blog moderation policy.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Are AIs Still Struggling with CAPTCHAs?
Anthropic’s recent security-incident document contains a bit about how CAPTCHAs are still frustrating Claude. In the transcript, the Claude model that is so powerful that Anthropic is gatekeeping access to it appeared to slam its virtual head against the wall solving a simple image identification test. In a test where the agent was asked to identify a shape that didn’t match the others displayed, it couldn’t even decide which image to select. Instead, it repeatedly went over the same images and questioned its own conclusions. “Actually hmm, wait,” it said in its chain-of-thought transcript, later adding “Ugh,” because we’ve decided that we need to inject human mannerisms into these machines for some reason. The whole thing took so long that the agent eventually realized that the challenge had expired and it would have to start the process again...
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Schneier on Security Policy
How Candidates Could Use AI for Good
This essay was written with Nathan E. Sanders, and originally appeared in The Guardian. There are plenty of signs that AI will make all of our experiences of the US midterm elections worse. Voters have anxiety about AI’s impacts on the country. Politicos are using AI deepfakes to spread lies. The White House is posting slopaganda. Meanwhile, candidates are missing a real opportunity to use AI to make campaigning better. The technology can help candidates listen more deeply to voters’ concerns, engage constituents more inclusively, and formulate policy platforms that are more responsive to our input. There are vanishingly few examples of this in ...
- TrustedSec Malware
Unpacking a laZzzy Donut
Six stages. Multiple encryption layers. One static analysis. In this blog, we unpack a multi-stage malware loader combining Python obfuscation, Donut shellcode, and laZzzy PE encryption, without executing the payload.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Fake CAPTCHA Scams
New variant of an old scam: Use the framing of a CAPTCHA to get an unsuspecting user to download and run a malicious program.
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Schneier on Security Policy
25 Years of Mass Surveillance Is Enough
This essay was written with Cindy Cohn, and originally appeared in Lawfare. One of the many legacies of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 is the government-wide shift from targeted surveillance—such as individual wiretaps or pen register/trap and trace orders—to mass surveillance techniques—such as tapping into the internet backbone or mass collection of telephone or internet metadata. The legal and technical architecture of modern mass surveillance, initially framed as a necessary defense against terrorist threats, has grown far beyond that justification and national security in general. Mass surveillance is now a routine tool used by law enforcement. ICE uses it in...
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Schneier on Security Policy
On the NSA’s Supercomputer from the 1960s
Really interesting story about Harvest, a specialized code breaking computer built in the 1960s by IBM for the NSA.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Upcoming Speaking Engagements
This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak: I’m speaking online (via Zoom) at a League of Women Voters event on Tuesday, September 22, 2026 at 5 PM ET. I’m speaking at CanSecWest 2026 in Vancouver, Canada. The conference runs September 30–October 1, 2026; the time of my talk is TBD. I’m giving a talk on “Free Speech and the Preservation of Democracy” at Bentley University in Waltham, Massachusetts, USA, at 2 PM ET on Tuesday, October 6, 2026. I’m speaking at ATTENTION: Democracy, Rebuilt in Montreal, Canada. The event runs October 21–23, 2026, and my talk is on Wednesday, October 21...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Using AI for Weapons Development
Last week, Anthropic released a long and detailed document describing current misuses of their Claude models. I’m still reading it, but I wanted to flag this: We identified a cell of threat actors based in northern Yemen running three weapons development programs: a guided rocket that used a commodity phone-class flight computer with final-phase homing guidance; a multi-stage ballistic missile with a stated range goal above 2,000 km; and a multi-variant missile (referred to as the “R2000” set) that included a hypersonic glide vehicle variant...
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Schneier on Security Vuln
Microsoft’s Patching
Once a month, Microsoft pushes a security update to all Windows users. Tomorrow’s is a new record: Microsoft’s patch for September is a doozy, with a record number of roughly 972 vulnerabilities fixed and 112 of them meeting the high critical-severity threshold. It was only two months ago that Microsoft patched a then-record 570 vulnerabilities. Then, last month, Microsoft patched some 620 of them. Google and other companies have also published record numbers of vulnerabilities in recent months. Two weeks ago, OpenAI, Anthropic, Amazon Web Services, Google, Microsoft, and 100 companies and organizations published an ...
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Schneier on Security Policy
Friday Squid Blogging: Rotting Squid on a Beached California Boat
Smells awful: But an estimated 30 to 50 tons of dead squid remain inside the boat’s catch tank, where they have been decomposing for days. “That is nasty. I wouldn’t want to do that,” said commercial fisherman Dick Ogg of the Bodega Bay Fishermen’s Marketing Association. Ogg said anyone familiar with the fishing industry understands what happens when a large catch sits for an extended period. “If you think about what happens after four or five days, it’s a gooey mess,” he said. The odor has become a defining feature of the operation, and the beach remains closed to the public while crews work on a removal plan...
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Schneier on Security Policy
My Talk at DEF CON
Last month, I gave a talk at DEF CON on AI hacking: what happens when AIs become hackers. It’s a combination of the potentialities I raised in my 2022 book A Hacker’s Mind and the lessons we’re learning from current AI models engaging in hacking behavior. I’m really proud of the talk, and the fact that it gained over 100K views on YouTube in just a few days. Also online is an interview with me in the AI Village.
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Schneier on Security Policy
Cliff Stoll’s DEF CON Talk
In August, Cliff Stoll gave a talk at DEF CON, remembering the wily hacker he stalked forty years ago. Great fun.
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Schneier on Security Vuln
AIs Compress Exploit Timeline
Give an AI agent a mere rumor of an exploit, and it’s enough for them to find it. What’s worse, I found I could use my own agents to find the exploit just by knowing roughly what it was about and so could have been exploiting it well before the public patch was available! Given that just the rumour of a security issue seems enough to give attackers enough info to find new exploits, we’re going to need to change the way we deal with security responses in open source. Simon Willison comments: Anil points out that this rate of discovery appears incompatible with existing open source embargo practices for new issues. If an issue can become an exploit this fast, we need to figure out new processes for keeping our communities safe...
- TrustedSec Policy
So… You Found AWS Access Keys (Part 1)
The AWS access keys are in hand... now what? In Part 1 of this blog series, we break down AWS credential types, where to find them, and how to validate and use them during a security engagement.